China’s “String of Pearls” strategy

The term ‘string of pearls’ was coined to describe China’s increasing forays into the Indian Ocean , in an effort to establish ‘nodes of influence’ in the region. Each “pearl” in the “String of Pearls” is a part of the nexus of Chinese geopolitical influence or military presence. The string of pearls includes “pearls” in many countries like Myanmar, Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka etc. Let us look at them one-by-one:

Myanmar: Myanmar does not lean towards either China or India. It tries to get the best out of the competition between China and India competing for it’s resources.

Bangladesh: Bangladesh currently has an India friendly government and army.

Nepal: China and India are currently locked in a tussle over Nepal. China has tried to exert considerable influence on the Nepali Maoists. However, India is not expected to lose its clout in Nepal.

Sri Lanka:  Hambantota port in Sri Lanka was developed by China and China supplies military wares to Sri Lanka. However, Indian influence in Sri lanka is not less either.

Maldives, Mauritius and Seychelles: China has been trying but has not been successful in getting ports or bases in these countries due to Indian objection.

Pakistan: The Pakistani proxy is not currently available to China due to the US influence.

Thus there is no compelling evidence yet to suggest that the plan has succeeded in its basing activities, though the dangers cannot be ruled out. China’s string of pearls strategy is not likely to give immediate headaches to Indian maritime security in the near future. However, there will inevitably come a time when India will have to face the reality of Chinese naval presence in its own backyard. Beijing will take all measures to cover its Achilles heel - its vulnerability to any interruption of its overseas trade.

Only when India’s strategic community understands that India is already well placed to counter China’s string of pearls, they will be able to overcome the sense of vulnerability. The presence of Chinese ships does not present any real threat to Indian naval forces in the region. It would rather provide the Indian Navy with a greater degree of tactical flexibility in the event of a future war with China, be it on land or at sea. This advantage can only be guaranteed, if India undertakes certain preparatory measures and curbs Chinese influence among certain key countries.